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Introduction 
In Whitmore v Euroways Express Coaches Ltd,1 a case that involved a claim for nervous shock, 
Comyn J was willing to relax what had become a central component of English law regarding 
such claims and awarded damages following the onset of ‘ordinary shock’. While certain 
academic and judicial commentators may now conclude that this was an astute observation 
leading to an easily defensible decision in keeping with emerging common law precedents in 
other jurisdictions,2 The Law Commission have described it as an ‘aberration’3 and have lent 
their full support to the maintenance of the orthodox standard.4 The sacred rule in English 
private law that Comyn J was willing to disregard concerns the definition of ‘nervous shock’ 
itself, and represents the minimum threshold that must be reached before an individual may 
seek to recover damages. As Lord Denning observed in Hinz v Berry, this term has been 
employed by the court to cover any ‘recognisable psychiatric illness.’5  This notion of a 
‘recognisable psychiatric illness’ as opposed to mere grief, distress or other emotion is one that 
has held particular sway with the courts having been restated on numerous occasions in both 
the House of Lords6 and the Court of Appeal.7 The standard test is most commonly attributed 
to Lord Bridge, who, in the McLoughlin case, noted, 
The common law gives no damages for the emotional distress which any normal 
person experiences when someone he loves is killed or injured. Anxiety and depression 
are normal human emotions. Yet an anxiety neurosis or reactive depression may be 
recognisable psychiatric illnesses, with or without psychosomatic symptoms. So the 
1 The Times, 4th May 1984
2NJ Mullany and PR Handford ‘Tort Liability for Psychiatric Damage’ (Law Book Company, Sydney 1993)  pgs 18-
21
3Law Commission Report no 249, Liability for Psychiatric Illness (London, HMSO, 1998) 
4Negligence (Psychiatric Illness) Bill s. 1(2), s. 2(2), s. 5(2)
5 Hinz v. Berry [1970] 2 Q.B. 40, Denning MR at 42
6 Alcock v CC of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 AC 310 (HL)422; Hicks v CC of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 
PIQR 433 (HL) 436; Page v Smith [1996] AC 155 (HL) 167, 171, 181, 189, 197; White(Frost)v CC of South 
Yorkshire Police [1999]2 AC 455 (HL)469, 491, 501
7Attia v British Gas plc [1988] QB 304 (CA) 320; Hicks v CC of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 All ER 690 (CA) 
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first hurdle which a plaintiff claiming damages of the kind in question must surmount 
is to establish that he is suffering, not merely grief, distress or any other normal 
emotion, but a positive psychiatric illness.8
Given a plain text reading this test may seem relatively straightforward. Indeed the apparent 
logic of such a de minimis threshold has no doubt contributed to its subsequent application in 
criminal law as well as private law, particularly as regards the courts’ reading of the Offences 
Against the Person Act 1861 to include the infliction of non-physical harm. Yet in reaching his 
decision, Comyn J reviewed the relevant case law extant at the time and, while conceding that 
orthodoxy required the presence of a recognised psychiatric condition, also identified that, ‘no 
absolutely clear picture emerges and many of the judgments speak with different voices.’9 
This article will examine in detail the many and varied rationales, and subsequent problems, 
that have emerged in relation to the retention of this test in both private and criminal law. In 
particular the focus shall be on the laws reliance on mental health science in maintaining this 
threshold. While the desire to defer to medical knowledge in determining the cut-off point 
between ‘mere emotion’ and ‘recognisable psychiatric injury’ is understandable, it will be 
argued that the increasingly passive position adopted by the courts belies the fundamental 
incompatibility between the questions of ultimate concern in the law, and the medical criteria 
used to make a clinical diagnosis. It will be demonstrated that this incompatibility has been 
exacerbated yet further by the publication of the latest edition of the diagnostic manual, the 
DSM-V, in 2013. To combat this it will be suggested that law makers should engage more 
proactively with the mental health sciences and seriously consider the creation of diagnostic 
guidelines specifically for use in the legal arena. While such suggestions have previously been 
dismissed on the grounds of practicality, the emergence of the diagnostically weak ‘Battered 
8McLoughlin v O’Brian [1983] AC 410 at 431 (Lord Bridge)
9 Above n 1
Women Syndrome’ as a relevant consideration in abused partner cases serves as an excellent 
example of the courts’ ability to proactively engage with the mental health sciences and  tailor 
medical knowledge to their own specific needs.
Private Law
The courts first displayed a willingness to engage with psychological and psychiatric principles 
of diagnosis as they pertain to claims for psychiatric injury due to negligence. In common law, 
the courts’ orthodox position on accepting the reality of psychiatric injury and thus permitting 
negligence claims for such conditions can trace its roots to the latter years of the 19th century 
in the Irish case of Bell v Great Northern Railway Co of Ireland10and the turn of the 20th century 
and the English case of Dulieu v White & Sons.11 In each of these cases the courts ruled for the 
first time that parties in breach of a duty could be held liable in negligence for causing some 
form of psychiatric injury so long as the victim’s condition could be shown to have derived 
from a reasonable fear of personal injury. In the Dulieu case Phillimore J stated that, ‘terror 
wrongfully induced and inducing physical mischief gives a cause of action.’12 The judgments 
in these cases marked a significant evolution in the thinking of the courts. Previously the 
orthodox position was characterised by a belief that in order for any kind of nervous shock to 
be recoverable it must also have been accompanied by a concurrent physical injury. Lord 
Wensleydale had commented that, ‘Mental pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does not 
pretend to redress, when the unlawful act complained of causes that alone.’13 Indeed in 1888 
the Privy Council had decided in the Australian case of Coultas,14 that psychiatric harm caused 
by fear of being run over by a train was too remote a condition to warrant a successful claim. 
10 (1890) 26 LR Ir 428
11 [1901] 2 KB 669
12 Ibid at 683
13 Lynch v Knight [1861] 9 HLC 577 at 590 (Lord Wensleydale)
14 Victorian Railways Commissioners v Coultas (1888) 13 App CAS 222
This initial reluctance to engage with the notion of psychiatric injury without an accompanying 
physical injury, as characterised by Lord Wensleydale, and the Privy Council judgment in 
Coultas, is perhaps understandable given the paucity of psychological/psychiatric evidence 
available at the time. Indeed, the courts are to be praised for the alacrity with which they were 
willing to engage with any notion of psychiatric injury as a result of negligence given the 
relative infancy of research based mental health science at that time. Less praiseworthy has 
been the speed with which private law courts have been willing to incorporate more 
contemporary terminologies to describe mental health issues; for example, from a mental health 
perspective, the continued use of ‘nervous shock’ as the umbrella term to describe all 
psychiatric injury is of itself problematic. As Trindade has correctly noted this is a relatively 
crude expression that fails to properly encapsulate the breadth of contemporary mental health 
science.15 While the retention of such outmoded terminology may itself be indicative of limited 
engagement with contemporary mental health science, as Lord Bridge stated, it is now accepted 
that it is possible for a claim in negligence to succeed without any physical component, 
provided the symptoms exceed ‘mere emotion’ and amount to a recognisable psychiatric injury. 
In determining the cut-off point between mere emotion and ‘recognisable psychiatric injury’, 
the courts have, for the most part, adopted a passive stance and been willing to defer to mental 
health practitioners, and the diagnostic criteria developed by the mental health sciences 
designed to aid suitably trained experts to make clinical diagnoses. As Lord Steyn commented, 
‘Where the line is to be drawn is a matter for expert psychiatric evidence.’16 This position is 
fully endorsed by the Law Commission who have stated that, ‘…expert medical evidence will 
15 FA Trindade ‘The Principles Governing the Recovery of Damages for Negligently Caused Nervous Shock’ (1986) 
45(3)  Cambridge Law Journal  476-500
16 White (n 6) at 491 (Lord Steyn)
generally be required to establish that the plaintiff has suffered a recognisable psychiatric 
illness’17, and by some academic commentators.18
Criminal Law
In comparison, criminal courts have generally demonstrated greater willingness to engage 
actively with contemporary mental health science. The explanation for this is doubtless rooted 
in the frequent characterisation of English criminal law as an adversarial struggle between the 
accused/defendant and the State.19 The relative disparity in resources between a private 
individual charged with a crime and the various branches of the State that are responsible for 
conducting criminal investigations and prosecutions, has received extensive judicial and 
academic comment.20 As a direct consequence of this ‘adversarial deficit’, great efforts have 
been taken to ensure that the rights of defendants, and indeed the reliability and integrity of 
criminal proceedings, are not unduly impinged upon at either the ‘evidential stage’ of the 
criminal process21 or during the trial itself. Increasingly mental health sciences have played an 
important role in maintaining this integrity with psychologists and psychiatrists being 
employed by the court in myriad situations. These range from participation in drafting some of 
the comprehensive guidelines provided for the police in the Codes of Practice that accompany 
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) regarding the appropriate measures to be 
observed when interviewing vulnerable individuals including the need for an appropriate adult 
17 Above at n 3 (para 2.3)
18 E.g. P Case ‘Secondary Iatrogenic Harm: Claims for Psychiatric Damage following a Death caused by Medical 
Error’ (2004) 67 MLR 561
19 A Ashworth and R Redmayne The Criminal Process (OUP, 4th Edn, 2010)
20 Ibid; H Stacey and M Lavarch Beyond The Adversarial System  (The Federation Press, Sydney 1999)
21 M Zander The Police and Criminal Evidence Act (Sweet & Maxwell, 5thEdn, 2005)
(AA) to be in attendance,22 to the extensive testing of defendants to ensure that their levels of 
suggestibility and/or compliance are not sufficiently high to render confession evidence 
unreliable,23 to more general assessments of an individual’s fitness to plead or stand trial.24 
While the effective use of both psychology and psychiatry to help ensure that both the rights 
of the defendant and the reliability of the criminal process are maintained is commendable, 
critics have argued that this application of mental health science to ‘evidential’ issues belies 
what can only be described as a traditionally reticent view of emotional harm in the criminal 
law, particularly as regards victimhood.25
The traditional position adopted by criminal courts in the UK has been one of extreme 
reluctance to engage with, or criminalise, behaviour that inflicts psychological harm on a victim 
without some accompanying physical injury.26 This prevailing focus on a tangible physical 
injury in criminal law closely mirrors the traditional position in tort, outlined above, which 
accorded a certain primacy to claims arising out of physical injury.27 This is particularly 
relevant as regards the Offences Against the Person Act 1861(the 1861 Act) which sets the 
standard definitions for a range of non-fatal injuries. Given the era in which this statute was 
drafted, it is perhaps unsurprising that no specific mention is made of emotional or psychiatric 
injury, but rather the focus is very much on varying degrees of ‘bodily’ or physical injury. In 
spite of this apparently narrow legislative framework the courts have introduced a broader 
reading of what constitutes ‘injury’ in a criminal context to include psychiatric harm. This 
willingness to extend protection to individuals who develop a ‘psychiatric illness’ as a result 
22 PACE code 3; S Young, EJ Goodwin, O Sedgwick and GH  Gudjonsson ‘The effectiveness of police custody 
assessments in identifying suspects with intellectual disabilities and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder’. (2013) 
11 BMC Med.248; B Littlechild and D Fearns ‘Mentally Vulnerable Adults in Police Detention’ in Mental Disorder 
and Criminal Justice (Russell House Publishing, 2005)
23 GH Gudjonsson The Psychology of Interrogations and Confessions: A Handbook (Wiley, 2003)
24 R v Pritchard (1836) 7 C&P 303: The Pritchard Test
25 E Erez ‘Who’s Afraid of the Big Bad Victim? Victim Impact Statements as Victim Empowerment and 
Enhancement of Justice’ (1999)  Crim LR 545
26J E Stannard ‘Sticks, Stones and Words: Emotional Harm and the English Criminal Law’ (2010) 74 The Journal 
of Criminal Law 533-556
27 ibid; H Teff Causing Psychiatric and Emotional Harm: Reshaping the Boundaries of Legal Liability (Hart 
Publishing Oxford and Portland, Oregon 2009)
of another’s behaviour can be neatly highlighted with reference to the conjoined cases of R v 
Ireland, R v Burstow.28 First, in R v Ireland, it was held that repeatedly making silent telephone 
calls to someone resulting in their developing a psychiatric illness can constitute actual bodily 
harm within the meaning given to that offence in the 1861 Act.29 Similarly, in R v Burstow the 
court held that stalking someone to the point that they develop a psychiatric illness can 
constitute grievous bodily harm.30 While these cases are indicative of the courts willingness to 
engage with the constraints imposed upon it by outdated legislation, it is crucial to note that 
any extension of criminal liability to include the infliction of non-physical injury must clearly 
still be couched within the strict tort standard of having caused a ‘recognisable psychiatric 
illness’ as opposed to mere emotion.
This point was reinforced in the Chan-Fook case by Hobhouse LJ who commented,
The phrase “actual bodily harm” is capable of including psychiatric injury, but 
it does not include mere emotions such as fear, distress or panic, nor does it include, as 
such, states of mind that are not in themselves evidence of some identifiable clinical 
condition.31
Indeed the court went further by declaring, per curiam, that ‘state of mind’ was an “unscientific 
expression” and therefore unhelpful in deciding if a psychiatric injury had occurred, rather 
expert evidence from a psychiatrist or psychologist would be required.32 Should such expert 
testimony not be introduced by the prosecution, the matter should not be left to the jury for 
consideration.33 This apparent willingness to defer to the scientific rigour offered by a clinical 
28 R v Burrows, R v Ireland [1998] AC 147
29 ibid at 158 (Lord Steyn)
30 ibid at 161 (Lord Steyn)
31 (1994) 99 Cr App R 147 at 152 (Hobhouse LJ)
32 ibid
33 ibid
diagnosis and to rely on expert testimony from mental health professionals closely mirrors the 
approach adopted in private law detailed above.
The key concern for both private and criminal courts therefore seems to be in establishing a 
cut-off point between ‘mere emotions’, and clinical symptoms amounting to psychiatric injury 
with expert testimony playing a key role in this process. This willingness to defer to the 
expertise of mental health practitioners and the diagnostic criteria that they use no doubt seems 
logical, particularly in light of the commonly held misconception that there exists a, 
‘considerable degree of international agreement on the classification of mental disorders and 
their diagnostic criteria.’34 While it may be true that on those occasions when experts are in 
agreement their testimony can be of significant value to the courts,35 as shall be seen, 
disagreements when they arise can lead to confusion and uncertainty. 
Diagnostic Disagreements
In private law, the propensity for practitioners to reach different conclusions is neatly 
evidenced in the Scottish case of Dickie v Flexcon Glenrothes Ltd.36  In that case, three different 
psychiatrists each came to different conclusions as to both the severity of the condition suffered 
by the plaintiff, and the very nature of the condition itself. One expert returned a diagnosis of 
a moderate depressive episode which was subsequently changed to a diagnosis of dysthymia; 
the second witness diagnosed a depressive disorder; and the final expert diagnosed an 
adjustment disorder. Furthermore, it was reported in the case that one of the experts was 
dismissive of the value of the diagnostic criteria themselves, having preferred to rely on his 
34 Sutherland v Hatton [2002] 2 All ER 1 at 5 (Hale LJ)
35 Monk v PC Harrington Ltd [2008] EWHC 1879 (QB)
36 [2009] Scot (D) 3/11 (Sheriff Court, Kircaldy, 4 sept 2009)
own clinical judgment, and that yet another was dismissive of the evidence provided by one of 
his colleagues noting that the terminology used was old fashioned.37
Similar disagreements between expert witnesses can readily be found in a criminal context, the 
case of Dhaliwal38 provides a particularly harrowing example of this. In that case, the defendant 
was charged with causing grievous bodily harm contrary to s. 20 of the 1861 Act, and 
manslaughter following the suicide of his wife. In support of these charges, evidence was 
adduced that showed the defendant had subjected his wife to sustained abuse which, while 
mostly psychological in nature, had also included clear incidents of physical assault.39 In spite 
of the clear evidence to suggest that this man’s conduct had led directly to his wife’s suicide, 
he was acquitted on both counts. The reasons for this acquittal were twofold. First, although 
there had clearly been instances of physical assault, the prosecution were unable to establish a 
direct causal link between these assaults and the victim’s suicide.40 Had they been able to 
establish such a direct causal link between the physical assaults endured by the victim and her 
death, the prosecution case would have been relatively straightforward, but instead the focus 
shifted onto the second issue; the exact nature of the psychological harm experienced by the 
victim. In keeping with the direction in Chan-Fook, in attempting to establish the severity of 
the victim’s condition at the time of her death, the prosecution commissioned expert reports 
from no less than three independent mental health professionals; one clinical psychologist with 
expertise in cases involving abused partners, Dr Roxanne Agnew-Davies, and two 
distinguished consultant psychiatrists, Dr Gillian Mezey and Dr L.P.Chesterman.41
It should be noted that in coming to their conclusions, none of these experts had the opportunity 
to meet and formally assess the victim. Instead they were provided with personal diaries of the 
37 ibid at 22 (Sheriff Braid)
38 R v Dhaliwal [2006] EWCA Crim 1139
39 ibid at 3
40 ibid at 8
41 ibid at 13
deceased and had access to evidence gathered by the police. While all of the experts agreed 
that the victim had clearly been subjected to a great deal of emotional and physical abuse, only 
Dr Mezey concluded that there was sufficient evidence to diagnose a recognised psychiatric 
illness, specifically clinical depression.42 Dr Agnew-Davies acknowledged that the victim’s 
ordeal had led to the presence of several symptoms of depression and PTSD, but could not be 
satisfied without formal assessment that these symptoms reached the required standard for a 
clinical diagnosis. Similarly while Dr Chesterman had no hesitation in concluding that the 
victim’s psychological functioning had clearly been impaired by sustained abuse, noting, 
‘[The] psychological impact of the assault perpetrated by her husband on the day of her suicide 
is likely to have been greatly magnified by the number of such experiences over many years’,43 
he was unable to confirm that this psychological impairment had resulted in a recognised 
psychiatric illness.  
As a consequence of this inconsistency between the experts reports produced, the prosecution 
were forced to concede that there was no recognised psychiatric illness and proceed with the 
case on the basis that the psychological impairment suffered by the victim was sufficient to 
constitute bodily injury.44 This proposition was rejected by both the trial judge, and on appeal, 
with the appeal court restating the orthodox position that only a recognisable psychiatric illness 
could constitute bodily harm.
Dimensional answers to categorical questions
In trying to explain why such disagreements occur, it is necessary to examine how mental 
health practitioners reach diagnoses. The diagnostic criteria used by mental health practitioners 
to determine the presence and extent of any psychiatric illness are contained within two 
42 ibid at 14
43 ibid at 15
44 ibid at 18
separate systems, the ICD 10 published by the World Health Organisation,45 and the DSM-V46 
published by the American Psychiatric Association.47 Despite its traditional reputation for 
reliability,48 the capacity for disagreement between practitioners, particularly within the finite 
timescale available for assessment in legal proceedings, is arguably unavoidable given the 
formulation of the DSM.49 While it is of course preferable, for the purposes of reliability, that 
two different clinicians viewing the same patient should come to the same clinical diagnosis, 
the checklist approach exemplified by diagnostic manuals does not, on a plain text reading, 
allow for full consideration of the contextual information and clinical experience that each 
practitioner may use in making their final assessment.50 Any disagreements that emerge in the 
ordinary course of clinical practice can usually be resolved by additional, more detailed 
assessments, a luxury not often afforded by the courts.51
This issue serves to highlight the crucial point that these criteria were not developed 
specifically for use in a legal environment, which places substantially different emphasis on 
the criteria than that which is applied in a purely clinical setting. From a clinical perspective, 
reliability in a diagnosis is important in facilitating appropriate treatment, yet in a legal context, 
the courts are simply concerned with whether or not the symptoms experienced by the claimant 
reach the de minimis threshold of recognisable psychiatric injury.52 In other words, the courts 
are seeking a categorical yes or no answer as to the presence of a recognised condition. 
However, while the conditions listed in the DSM may appear categorical they are in fact 
45 The consultation process preceding the release of the ICD-11 is currently ongoing
46 The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 5th edn, 2013)
47  For the purposes of this article greater emphasis will be place on the role of the DSM as it focuses solely on 
mental health diagnoses. The ICD 10 is a general classification of all diagnosable conditions, with those pertaining 
to mental health being contained in chapter 5.
48 R Mayes and A Horowitz ‘DSM-III and the Revolution in the Classification of Mental Illness’ (2005) Journal of 
Hist Behavioural Science 249
49 H Kennedy  ‘Limits of Psychiatric Evidence in Civil Courts and Tribunals: Science and Sensibility’ (2004) 10 
Medico-Legal Journal Ireland 16, 18
50 D Gill ‘Proving and Disproving Psychiatric Injury’ (2008) 78 Medico-Legal Journal 143
51 Kennedy, above at n 49
52 Noble v Owens [2008] EWHC 359 (QB)
frequently dimensional, being composed of a series of clinically important symptoms that in 
practice occur in varying levels of severity, and which in turn may be relevant to multiple 
different diagnoses.53 This adds greatly to the difficulty inherent in coming to a final diagnosis.
This fundamental difference in approach has led to much difficulty in satisfactorily applying 
the diagnostic criteria in a legal context.54 It is perhaps for this reason that in several instances 
judges have been willing to extend leeway to expert witnesses regarding the extent to which 
they frame their testimony within the language of the diagnostic criteria. Morland J in particular 
has commented that these strict categorisations are of limited value noting that the 
persuasiveness of the testimony, rather than the specific label used to describe the condition in 
question, is what matters to the court55. A similar attitude has been expressed in the Irish case 
of Murtagh v MOD,56 where the court makes specific reference to the ‘wealth of experience’ 
and ‘clinical diagnostic expertise’ of the witness being of greater importance than ‘formulaic 
categorisations’. Other judgments have also dammed the diagnostic criteria with faint praise 
by describing them as ‘a useful guide’57 but ‘not necessarily conclusive.’58 Such an approach 
to expert witnesses presents a real danger that it is the persuasiveness of the expert rather than 
the severity of the symptoms that may ultimately decide the outcome of a case. 
Judge as mental health expert
53 DA Grayson ‘Can Categorical and Dimensional Views of Psychiatric Illness be Distinguished?’ (1987)  151 British 
journal of Psychiatry 355
54 Dickie above n 36 at 33 (Sheriff Braid) An excellent example of this can be seen in Sheriff Braids summary of 
the submissions pertinent to the Dickie case and the conclusion that, ‘the diagnosis of psychiatric illness in not an 
exact science!” 
55 Group B Plaintiffs v UKMRC [2000] Lloyd’s Rep Med 161 (QB) at 113 (Moorland J)
56 [2008] IEHC at 292
57 Gardner v Epirotiki Steamship Co (QBD, 7 Jun 1994) Wright J
58 Rorrison v West Lothian College [2000] SCLR 245 Lord Reed
Perhaps more troublingly, from the perspective of the mental health practitioner, there are also 
several examples of the court making its own interpretation of the diagnostic criteria without 
the aid of trained mental health experts, an approach no doubt facilitated by the checklist 
appearance of these criteria in the diagnostic manuals,59 and the difficulty in securing consistent 
expert testimony. In both England60 and Australia61 courts applied what Brigg J termed a 
‘common sense application of the DSM-IV criteria’,62 in determining if the symptoms required 
for a diagnosis of pathological gambling where present. Similarly with regards the veracity of 
a claim based upon the presence of PTSD, Evans LJ seemed dismissive of the need for expert 
testimony, at least initially, preferring instead an examination of the ‘factual evidence’ about 
the claimant’s behaviour based on his own interpretation of the symptoms listed in the 
diagnostic manual.63 The temptation for the court to indulge in this kind of analysis is perhaps 
understandable given both the propensity for practitioners to disagree about a diagnosis, and 
the check-list presentation of symptoms in the DSM that may, on an initial inspection, seem 
self-explanatory to even the most clinically inexperienced reader; nevertheless judicial restraint 
should be employed as far as is practical. 
As has been discussed, the check-list appearance of symptoms belies the requisite underlying 
clinical expertise and judgment required to fully diagnose a condition. Furthermore, as Gill 
noted, a more detailed reading of both the DSM and ICD diagnostic manuals reveals a series 
of subtle caveats that accompany the more clearly stated list of symptoms, and that these 
caveats must be fully considered before arriving at any reliable diagnosis; yet this process is 
frequently overlooked in the legal arena64. Indeed the DSM itself contains a specific warning 
59 Gill above n 50
60 Calvert v William Hill Credit Ltd [2008] EWHC 454 
61 Foroughi v Star City Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1503
62 Calvert v William Hill Credit Ltd above n 60 at 134 (Brigg J)
63 Vernon v Bosley (No 1) [1997] 1 All ER 577 (CA) at 598 (Evans LJ)
64 Gill above n 50
about the dangers inherent with an interpretation of symptoms without the requisite clinical 
expertise, 
When DSM categories, criteria, and textual descriptions are employed for 
forensic purposes, there is a risk that diagnostic information will be misused or 
misunderstood. These dangers arise because of the imperfect fit between the questions 
of ultimate concern to the law and the information contained in a clinical diagnosis.65
The importance of Policy considerations
In spite of these fundamental concerns surrounding the utility of these diagnostic standards in 
a legal setting, their continued use has received additional judicial support after Burnton LJ 
restated the importance of the diagnostic criteria in establishing the presence of a recognisable 
psychiatric illness.66 That this standard is being so jealously guarded in spite of the concerns 
raised, speaks volumes for its utility in providing a method for judicial control.67 When viewed 
through the prism of private law, as Comyn J previously noted,68 certainty as to the rationale 
underlying the courts’ desire to exercise such control has at times been far from clear. One 
possible explanation for the ongoing use of ‘recognisable psychiatric injury’ as the orthodox 
standard for a successful claim, in spite of the difficulty inherent in applying the medical 
knowledge, is offered by Lord Justice Evans who commented that, ‘in technical legal terms, 
damages for ‘normal’ grief and suffering may be said to be too remote to be recoverable in 
65 DSM-V above n 46 at pg 25
66 Hussain v CC of West Mercia Constabulary [2003] EWCA Civ 1205 
67 See Group B Plaintiffs v UKMRC [2000] Lloyd’s Rep Med 161 (QB) Moorland J at 163 describing it as a “powerful 
control mechanism”
68 above n 1
law.’69  Yet academic commentary70 and alternative judicial opinion71 would seem to refute 
this suggestion, instead noting that policy concerns rather than legal principles underlie the 
courts’ attachment to such a high orthodox standard; indeed, as seems clear, retention of such 
a standard has been for ‘reasons more to do with policy than logic.’72 As Giliker73 has observed, 
these policy concerns can seemingly be overcome in certain situations as damages for the 
infliction of mental distress falling below the threshold of recognisable psychiatric injury have 
been awarded in the form of aggravated damages, provided there is an accompanying physical 
injury. Additionally, supplementary damages for mental distress may accompany ordinary 
compensation in the case of intentionally inflicted torts, or torts that are actionable per se. 
Crucially this apparent recognition of more minor symptoms occurs in a subtle, almost 
secretive fashion with the courts remaining unwilling to openly acknowledge this as a head of 
damages. In particular, there has been a refusal to consider any such award in relation to 
negligence cases where policy objections have remained insurmountable.
Chief among these policy concerns74 is a desire to control the number of possible claimants so 
as to limit the financial liability that may be incurred by the state, private insurance companies, 
or private individuals, as such resources are ‘finite’.75 As Lord Wilberforce noted, mental injury 
is, ‘capable of affecting so wide a range of people, [there is] a real need for the law to place 
some limitation on the extent of admissible claims.’76 Yet the sheer number of limiting 
mechanisms developed by U.K. courts has received extensive criticism.77 Rather than operating 
as occasional limiting factors, policy considerations have come to dominate any discussion on 
69 Vernon v Bosley (No 1) [1997] 1 All ER 577 (CA) at 604 (Evans LJ)
70 R Mulheron “Rewriting the Requirement for a ‘Recognised Psychiatric Injury’ in Negligence Claims” (2012) 32(1)  
OJLS 77-112
71 Alcock v CC of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 AC 310 (HL)422 at 418 (Lord Oliver)
72 White v London Fire & Civil Defence Authority [1999] 2 AC 410 at 511 (Lord Hoffman)
73 P Giliker ‘A ‘new’ head of damages: damages for mental distress in the English law of torts’ (2000) 20(1) Legal 
Studies 11 - 41
74 Although certainly not the only such concern. See Teff, above n 27, pgs 141-170 for a comprehensive review. 
75 Sion v Hampstead HA [1994] 5 Med LR 170 (CA) at 173 (Staughton LJ)
76 McLoughlin v O’Brien above n 8 at 421 (Lord Wilberforce)
77 K Patten ‘Patchwork Quilt Law’ (2013) New Law Journal, 24th May
psychiatric injury claims. In particular the troublesome contemporary position in U.K. private 
law that differentiates between primary and secondary victims serves as an excellent example 
of the primacy afforded to policy considerations in English private law, with the controls 
applied to secondary victims being a topic of considerable academic78 and judicial debate.79 
The development and retention of these policy controls has seen the U.K. diverge widely from 
other common law jurisdictions such as Australia where, in summarising the position of the 
law in the UK, Gummow J observed that the policy controls were being operated in an 
‘arbitrary’ and ‘capricious’ manner, further noting that such unprincipled distinctions ‘bring 
the law into disrepute.’80
Given that the development and maintenance of such seemingly controversial and arbitrary 
restrictions has become one of the central preoccupations of civil courts in the U.K., 
particularly following the Hillsborough disaster, a more cynical view should perhaps be taken 
of the Law Commission and judiciary’s insistence that the diagnostic criteria and the orthodox 
standard of ‘recognisable psychiatric illness’ be retained in spite of the obvious problems in 
application detailed above. Rather than being based on a genuine misunderstanding as to the 
strengths and weaknesses of the diagnostic process, retention of this standard seems to offer 
some additional arbitrary measure of imagined diagnostic or scientific justification for 
financially driven policy decisions. It is important to note that the purpose of highlighting this 
point is not to add further criticism to the courts’ retention of policy controls in general. Rather 
it is to emphasise that such policy concerns should be entirely divorced from any discussion as 
to the efficacy of retaining ‘recognisable psychiatric injury’ as the de minimis threshold for a 
successful claim in negligence. Indeed, by allowing the diagnostic criteria to be used as such 
78 Ibid; Mulheron above n 70; P Handford, ‘Psychiatric Injury in breach of a relationship’ (2007) 27(1) Legal Studies 
26-50
79 See White above n 6 at 496-498 (Lord Steyn) and at 504 (Lord Hoffmann)
80 Tame v New South Wales, Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Ltd (2002) 191 ALR 449 at 494 (Gummow JJ)
an additional means of judicial control lawmakers in the U.K. have left themselves at the mercy 
of ongoing developments in mental health sciences.
Developments in Mental Health Science
As has been examined earlier, to suggest that there is ‘considerable international agreement’81 
is demonstrably false in terms of the number of divergent opinions that may manifest between 
different, equally well trained and experienced practitioners regarding a single diagnosis. 
Crucially the same may be said in terms of the levels of support within the mental health 
professions for the criteria set out in the DSM generally. A key concern has emerged regarding 
the presence of diagnostic inflation that has seen a dramatic increase in the numbers of 
individuals receiving a psychiatric diagnosis82. The publication of the new DSM-V in 2013 has 
subsequently received extensive criticism from within the ranks of mental health professionals; 
including high profile concerns raised by Robert Spitzer83 and Allen Frances84 the chairmen of 
the DSM-III and DSM-IV taskforces respectively, regarding its likely impact on such 
diagnostic inflation. Of central concern is the new appearance of the criteria which have 
departed from the relatively strict categorisations contained in the DSM-IV and are now more 
broadly conceived, including new categories and lower diagnostic thresholds,
DSM-5 seems likely to convert diagnostic inflation into diagnostic 
hyperinflation by adding new, questionable, and untested diagnoses, and by reducing 
the thresholds for existing diagnoses. Normal grief may be mislabeled as major 
81  Sutherland v Hatton above n 34 at 5 (Hale LJ)
82
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depressive disorder, temper tantrums become disruptive mood dysregulation disorder, 
normal forgetfulness in old age is now mild neurocognitive disorder, overeating is 
binge-eating disorder, and poor concentration is adult attention-deficit/hyperactivity 
disorder85
 These criticisms have been underlined by a perceived lack of transparency during the 
consultation process leading up to publication, sparking fears that the pharmaceutical industry 
was exerting undue influence to ensure that diagnostic criteria were lowered so as to profit 
from the subsequent rise in diagnoses requiring medication86. Similar concerns have been 
raised by a number of psychological and psychiatric associations, including the British 
Psychological Society who, in an open letter in 2011 stated, 
The Society is concerned that clients and the general public are negatively 
affected by the continued and continuous medicalisation of their natural and normal 
responses to their experiences; responses which undoubtedly have distressing 
consequences which demand helping responses, but which do not reflect illnesses so 
much as normal individual variation.
Regardless of whether the courts purported adherence to the diagnostic criteria is fuelled by a 
genuine desire to defer to mental health experts, or a need to provide justification for policy 
based decisions, the possible lowering of the diagnostic threshold leading to the 
‘medicalisation’ of ‘natural’ and ‘normal’ responses has the potential to dramatically increase 
the number of claimants that reach the required standard of ‘recognisable psychiatric illness’. 
While it is too early in the life of the DSM-V to reach any firm conclusion as to the merits of 
85 A Frances and M Raven ‘Two views of the new DSM-5: The Need for Caution in Diagnosing and Treating Mental 
Disorders’ (2013) 88(8) Am Fam Physician 88 (8): online < http://www.aafp.org/afp/2013/1015/od1.html> 
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such concerns, the mere suggestion that the diagnostic thresholds have been lowered must be 
of concern to the courts. 
In response to these criticisms advocates in favour of the new system, including David Kupfer, 
the chair of the DSM-V taskforce, while acknowledging the relative breadth of the new 
categories when compared with DSM-IV, have refuted the suggestion that diagnostic 
thresholds have been substantially lowered87. Rather it is suggested that the DSM-V has a 
broader construction to ensure sensitivity to as many symptoms and conditions as possible, but 
that the more explicit emphasis on the dimensional assessment of the severity of symptoms 
contained within the manual will act as an inbuilt check against diagnostic inflation88. As 
mentioned above, Grayson89 has already observed that such a dimensional examination of 
symptoms already played an important role in reaching a diagnosis; however as Gill noted90 
the inclusion of such additional measures in the DSM-IV were relatively subtle. In contrast, 
the DSM-V explicitly includes a series of severity measures that are to be applied before a 
diagnosis can be confirmed and appropriate intervention planned. 
While this attempt to more openly consider the dimensional component of conditions may 
indeed serve to address concerns about diagnostic inflation, it is difficult to see how such a 
change can have anything other than a negative impact on the utility of the diagnostic manual 
in a legal context. The reasons for this are twofold; first, as has already been discussed, the 
dimensional component of a diagnosis has always been problematic for the courts given their 
preference for a strictly categorical answer as to the presence of any condition. That this 
dimensional component is now set to play such an important role can only serve to accentuate 
this problem. The second issue of concern relates to the time required to complete a diagnosis. 
87 DJ Kupfer, EA Kuhl and DA Regier ‘Two views of the new DSM-5: A Diagnostic Guide Relevant to Both Primary 
Care and Psychiatric Practice’ (2013) 88(8) Am Fam Physician 88 (8): online 
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As previously discussed, experts who have been asked to reach a diagnosis for legal 
proceedings must operate within a finite timescale but both the critics and supporters of the 
DSM-V are in agreement that individual practitioners should take a more longitudinal view of 
diagnoses with greater care being taken before a diagnosis is confirmed and medication 
prescribed91. This call for a more longitudinal approach must surely clash with the time 
constraints inherent to legal proceedings and place yet further pressure on expert witnesses. As 
mentioned above, this is of particular concern as attempting to expedite the diagnostic process 
for legal proceedings has been a contributing factor in contradictory testimony from different 
experts which has in turn produced confusion and uncertainty. 
Thus, even if the concerns raised about the lowering of the diagnostic thresholds proves to be 
unfounded, the publication of the DSM-V seems set to accentuate the existing difficulties 
inherent in applying diagnostic material in a legal environment. Such developments within the 
mental health professions must surely undermine the extent to which the court can with 
confidence rely on the diagnostic criteria, and indeed increasingly contradictory expert 
testimony, while simultaneously attempting to both limit the numbers of potential claimants, 
and maintain the integrity of legal proceedings. 
Policy concerns in the criminal law
Since criminal law has borrowed so heavily from private law with regards psychiatric injury, 
and the need for expert testimony, these developments in the mental health sciences must 
necessarily be a cause for concern. Yet the impact of such changes to the diagnostic process is 
more difficult to gauge in respect of criminal law as the underlying rationale for the retention 
of such a high de minimis threshold in relation to the 1861 Act is less clear. The most persuasive 
91 Frances and Raven above n 86; Kupfer et al above n 88
policy argument offered to explain the reluctance of U.K. courts to extend criminal liability 
under the Offences Against the Person Act to cases of ‘mere emotion’ is rooted in the same 
basic floodgates argument that applies in private law92. When applied in the context of criminal 
law this argument manifests as an awareness of the stigma attached to a criminal conviction, 
and the severity of the possible sanctions to be enforced against a guilty party. This is 
particularly relevant given the propensity of everyday human interaction to provoke emotional 
responses of one kind or another; as Teff stated, ‘Since much everyday conduct can have 
adverse emotional effects on others, imposing penal sanctions too readily could inhibit socially 
defensible behaviour.’93
Given this analysis it would seem that fears regarding the lowering of diagnostic thresholds, 
should they prove founded, could have a dramatic impact on the number of cases that reach the 
de minimis standard, thus confounding any attempt to limit criminal liability. However, while 
the desire to limit the unnecessary imposition of penal sanctions is undoubtedly within the 
contemplation of the courts, there is less evidence to suggest that the ‘recognisable psychiatric 
injury’ test that necessitates reliance on the diagnostic criteria has been retained solely to 
facilitate this policy concern. Rather it would seem that in some instances attempts have already 
been made to develop a more inclusive approach to mental harm suffered by victims of specific 
crimes. In R v Brewster,94 Lord Bingham, the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales at the 
time, extolled the virtue of such an approach in relation to burglary by making specific 
reference to the psychological impact that such a crime has on individuals whose home has 
been broken into,95 and encouraged judges to acknowledge this impact when considering 
92 Stannard above n 26
93 Teff  above n 27 at pg 31
94 [1998] 1 Cr App R 220
95 See M Maguire and T Bennett  Burglary in a Dwelling (London, Heinemann, 1982)
sentencing.96 Perhaps more significantly, the Protection Against Harassment Act 1997 already 
penalises behaviour that causes alarm or distress, both mere emotions. Originally conceived as 
a legislative response to stalkers,97 this Act has received a broad interpretation that covers all 
forms of harassment.98 While some commentators have suggested that the courts’ reading of 
the Act may result in it being of little use in domestic settings such as Dhaliwal,99 there can be 
little doubt that this legislation gives the court a broader framework within which to consider 
criminal sanctions for the infliction of more minor psychological harm. 
In light of this apparent weakness in the floodgates argument, a more persuasive explanation 
for the retention of the de minimis standard may be rooted in the on-going use of legislation 
from the middle part of the 19th century as the framework within which all non-fatal injuries 
must be conceptualised. Lord Steyn has acknowledged the difficulty inherent in devising a 
contemporary understanding of non-physical injury within the current framework noting that, 
‘The proposition that a Victorian Legislator when enacting section 18, 20 and 47 of the Act 
1861, would not have had in mind psychiatric illness is no doubt correct. Psychiatry was in its 
infancy in 1861.’100 This incompatibility between this legislative framework dealing with 
offences against the person and contemporary notions of non-physical injury has not gone 
unnoticed, and several recommendations have been made suggesting reform of the law in this 
area to be more inclusive of mental health issues and non-physical harm. The Law Commission 
have made several such recommendations including the use of more contemporary language 
that would be more nuanced and inclusive of broader definitions of harm and victimhood, 
specifically in relation to non-physical harm101. Subsequently the Home Office have explored 
wide ranging reform of the legislation relating to non-fatal injury by consulting about a possible 
96 R v Brewster above n 95 at 225-227 (Lord Bingham)
97 N Addison and T Lawson-Cruttenden, Harassment Law and Practice (Blackstone Press: London, 1997) 
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Offences Against the Person Bill which would include a wider definition of ‘injury’ to include 
‘any impairment of an individual’s mental health’102. While the adoption of such a 
contemporary Bill would undoubtedly have provided the courts a broader framework within 
which to consider issues pertaining to non-physical injury, as of yet these proposed reforms 
have not been implemented. In the absence of a more contemporary framework within which 
to define non-physical harm it is difficult to imagine how the courts could include more minor 
symptoms without stretching the meaning of the 1861 Act past the point of credulity. 
An alternative justification for retaining recognisable psychiatric injury as the de minimis 
standard in relation to the 1861 Act was offered by Sir Igor Judge who, in the Dhaliwal case, 
focused on the need for certainty, by commenting that allowing contemplation of more minor 
symptoms would lead to ‘problems of conflicting medical opinion’103. Yet as has been 
discussed such problems already exist in numerous cases, including Dhaliwal. Indeed this 
argument would seem to reaffirm the mistaken judicial belief that mental health practitioners 
apply a simple yes or no test of severity in reaching a clinical diagnosis. While this argument 
fails to fully explain retention of the de minimis standard in relation to the 1861 Act it does 
highlight the importance attached to certainty in legal proceedings and recognition of how 
damaging conflicting medical opinion can be. Crucially it is here that the changes in the 
diagnostic process caused by the publication of the DSM-V are likely to have the most 
damaging impact on both criminal and private law. As has been discussed the dimensional 
element of a diagnosis, which has always proved to be a difficult consideration for the courts, 
seems set to become an even more important factor for mental health practitioners following 
the publication of the new diagnostic manual. This change, when coupled with the already 
imperfect application of medical knowledge within the legal environment is likely to produce 
greater levels of disagreement between experts adding yet further confusion and uncertainty. 
102 Home Office, Violence: Reforming the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (London, Home Office, 1998)
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The case for reform
 In light of these concerns regarding the fundamental compatibility between the diagnostic 
criteria and the legal setting in which they are being asked to operate, several academic 
commentators have questioned the wisdom of their continued influence in the courtroom. To 
circumvent this problem, it has been suggested that in the context of private law, the basic 
standard of ‘recognisable psychiatric illness’, that necessitates reliance on diagnostic criteria, 
should be lowered, and that instead the court should seek to determine if the claimant has 
developed a psychological condition, ‘sufficiently different’ from normal human emotions104. 
In advancing this argument, Mulheron has highlighted many of the issues pertaining to 
interpretation and compatibility discussed above and has drawn on a growing body of judicial 
opinion that would seem to suggest support for lowering the threshold for a successful 
negligence claim105. Similar calls for a lowering of diagnostic thresholds have also been made 
in the context of criminal law, particularly from commentators who, notwithstanding the broad 
scope of the Protection Against Harassment Act, have highlighted the perceived deference with 
which the criminal process views the rights of the defendant and contrast it with the relative 
insensitivity that has characterised the traditional approach to victims106. They have argued that 
while concerns as to the danger of criminalising everyday behaviours and interactions are 
certainly relevant, so too should be a more complete and inclusive awareness of the emotional 
cost borne by victims of non-physical injury107. 
104 T Ward ‘Psychiatric Evidence and Judicial Fact Finding’ (1999) 3 Int J Evidence 180, 187
105 Mulheron above n 70
106 J Doak ‘The Victim and the Criminal Process: an analysis of recent trends in regional and international tribunals’ 
(2002) 23 Legal Studies, 1
107 Standard above n 26
On initial inspection the composition of the DSM-V with broader categorisations of conditions 
may seem to help facilitate such a change without the need for reform. However, the previous 
calls for a lowering of the diagnostic threshold were predicated on the assumption that any such 
change should be achieved and managed by the courts so as to ensure easier application of 
medical knowledge within the legal framework.  While reliance on the diagnostic criteria in 
DSM-V may achieve the desired lower threshold, for the reasons outlined above, it is highly 
unlikely to facilitate greater compatibility. In point of fact the central importance of 
dimensional assessments seems likely to foster even greater interpretative difficulties. This 
problem is likely to be greatly magnified if law makers adopt a passive stance and refuse to 
engage with these issues.
An alternative solution that would encourage more proactive engagement was suggested in 
Australia where the Ipp committee, while failing to recommend a reduction in the ‘recognised 
psychiatric illness’ threshold, was highly sceptical regarding the continued usefulness of the 
diagnostic criteria contained in both the ICD-10 and DSM for legal proceedings, going so far 
as to recommend their replacement with a different set of guidelines drawn up specifically for 
legal purposes in conjunction with mental health experts108. The advantage of such an approach 
is that it would permit the courts to exercise greater control with regards the issues of central 
importance to mental health diagnoses from a legal standpoint, while simultaneously assisting 
expert witnesses to better understand which particular elements of a clinical diagnosis are 
relevant to the courts. In the U.K. such suggestions have previously been considered and 
rejected by the Law Commission on grounds of practicality109; further noting the continued 
importance of the diagnostic criteria contained in these manuals to the psychiatric profession110. 
108 ‘Mental Harm’ in Review of the law of negligence: Final Report (2002) (‘Ipp report’) as yet unenacted
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Yet there is evidence to suggest that in certain circumstances the courts have already been 
willing to engage directly with mental health issues to devise diagnostic guidelines.  The 
emergence of Battered Women Syndrome (BWS) as a relevant consideration in cases where 
abused partners retaliate is an excellent example of this. BWS and other associated symptoms 
have played a pivotal role in a series of successful appeals111; and its influence can be readily 
identified when examining the defence of loss of control112 that replaced the old defence of 
provocation.  First outlined by Walker, a psychologist, in the 1970’s, and substantially revised 
in 1992113 and 2006114, BWS attempts to explain and categorise the experiences common to 
women who had experienced spousal abuse. Advocates of this syndrome have suggested that 
women who are exposed to sustained violence become dissociated, exhibiting signs of 
depression, helplessness and hopelessness that serve to restrict their capacity to leave abusive 
relationships115. As Schuller and Hastings contend, the emergence of BWS as a relevant 
consideration can doubtless be explained by the apparent legitimacy of such a diagnosis116. Yet 
several flaws in methodology and scientific validation exist relating to this syndrome in each 
of its incarnations, most notable among which is the fact that it is not classified in any version 
of the DSM117.
BWS was originally conceptualised as Learned Helplessness in an attempt to explain the 
passivity of abused women and their apparent inability to leave their relationships118.  Yet this 
characterisation has been refuted by empirical evidence that suggests that passivity may 
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actually be a response designed by abused women to minimise violence119. Early versions of 
BWS also focused on the behaviour of the abuser, describing a cycle of violence including 
‘tension building’, ‘acute battering’, and ‘contrite loving’120.  However, empirical evidence in 
support of the cycle of violence is hard to come by, and as one commentator noted, that 
evidence which does exist is not entirely convincing121. Subsequent definitions of BWS were 
intentionally revised to be synonymous with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)122, a 
condition that is listed in the DSM and which has been empirically linked to cases of 
relationship violence123. Yet as Dutton has noted, empirical support for PTSD should not be 
confused for empirical support for BWS as, ‘there is no “type” of PTSD called BWS’124. 
In spite of the relatively weak methodological rigor that has been employed in devising BWS, 
even its most ardent critics would concede that it has done much to highlight the plight of 
abused partners and has helped to focus the attention of mental health researchers on the 
symptoms that may manifest in individuals who have experienced psychological and physical 
abuse125. Evidence now suggests that while symptoms of this kind may be common in 
individuals who have sustained such abuse, they will be experienced differently by each 
individual126 and at times may not present as sufficiently severe to merit a clinical diagnosis127. 
Indeed at times such a clinical diagnosis may be unhelpful as it may characterise as ‘abnormal’ 
a series of responses that should rightly be viewed as reasonable. Yet the courts are seemingly 
alive to the importance of more minor symptoms, at least as they relate to battered women who 
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kill, as evidenced by the judgment of Lord Justice Rose in R v Smith, when he accepted that, 
“more minor symptoms are relevant to provocation128, when they may not be to diminished 
responsibility”129. 
That BWS has played such an important role in the direction that the criminal law has taken 
with regards not only to a series of high profile cases, but also the revised statutory approach 
to provocation/loss of control, is perhaps surprising given the apparent reluctance of law 
makers to engage with diagnostic issues. Yet the purpose of highlighting the inclusion of 
diagnostically weak ‘syndrome’ in the courts’ considerations is not to criticise. That the courts 
can rightly claim to have helped shape the evolution of research into the psychological impact 
of domestic abuse while simultaneously establishing which symptoms are of particular 
relevance in a legal context is perhaps the best example of the legal profession engaging with 
mental health sciences in a proactive way. The adoption of such a nuanced and engaged 
understanding in relation to domestic abuse stands in stark contrast with the passive acceptance 
of the diagnostic guidelines in relation to psychiatric injury generally. Crucially this approach 
would seem to undermine concerns regarding the practicality of devising a set of diagnostic 
guidelines for legal purposes. 
Conclusion
Retention of ‘recognisable psychiatric injury’ as the de minimis threshold for both a successful 
claim in negligence, and prosecution under the 1861 Act, has received extensive scholarly 
criticism, with repeated calls having been made for a new threshold inclusive of more minor 
symptoms. While there is undoubtedly merit in discussing the possible inclusion of more minor 
symptoms, this article contends that the main problem caused by retention of such a high 
threshold is the increasingly passive position adopted by the Law Commission and legislators 
128 NB this case occurred before the new loss of control defence came into being hence the reference to provocation
129 R v Smith [2002] EWCA Crim 2671 at 40 (Rose LJ)
regarding expert testimony and, by extension, the diagnostic guidelines that help mental health 
practitioners to diagnose psychiatric conditions. Of central concern is the difficulty inherent in 
adequately incorporating this medical knowledge in a legal setting which places different 
emphasis on the importance of reliable diagnoses than that which is seen in normal clinical 
settings. This has resulted in repeated disagreements between experts as to the correct diagnosis 
leading to conflicting testimony and inconsistencies in levels of judicial support for such 
evidence.
In spite of this the Law Commission and certain judges have seemingly been convinced of the 
central importance of the diagnostic guidelines noting their importance to the mental health 
professions. Yet it is crucial to note that any importance attached to these criteria by mental 
health practitioners is predicated on their utility in a clinical setting, not a legal one. Further, as 
has been discussed, universal acceptance of the diagnostic criteria amongst mental health 
professionals is a debatable point, particularly following publication of the DSM-5 which 
seems set to exacerbate these pre-existing difficulties concerning the application of medical 
knowledge within a legal setting. In light of this, continued attempts to rely on these diagnostic 
guidelines in a legal context are analogous with trying to fit a square peg into a round hole. The 
most obvious solution to this problem is the development of new diagnostic guidelines 
specifically designed for use in a legal setting. Such a suggestion has previously been dismissed 
as impractical, yet as has been demonstrated the courts proactive participation in establishing 
BWS as a relevant consideration in domestic abuse cases, despite its omission from the DSM, 
would seem to confirm both the practicality and importance of properly adapting medical 
knowledge before attempting to apply it in court.
Acknowledgments
 The author wishes to acknowledge Dr Ciara Hackett for her thoughtful assistance with the 
preparation of this manuscript.
